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NOTES
Immunity from Prosecution and the Fifth Amendment:
An Analysis of Constitutional Standards
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of the degree of immunity from prosecution that must
be afforded a witness in order to supplant temporarily his fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination and thus justify compelling
him to testify concerning his own criminal activity has become the
subject of no little judicial controversy.
A primary focus of any inquiry into the immunity question must
necessarily be upon the unresolved conflict between the testimonial and
transactional immunity approaches. Transactional immunity, on one
hand, affords a witness absolute immunity from prosecution for the
offense to which the testimony relates, but testimonial immunity, on the
other hand, provides protection only from the use of the testimony itself
or any evidence derived' directly or indirectly from it-use and fruits
immunity. Until the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States
v. Kastigar, conflict over the immunity concept was best manifested by
the attempts to formulate an appropriate characterization of the rela-
tionship between Counselman v. Hitchcock,2 which represents the trans-
actional immunity approach, and Murphy v. Waterfront Commissioner
of New York Harbor,3 representing a departure from the transactional
immunity standard toward a testimonial immunity approach. The Su-
preme Court in Kastigar attempted to reconcile the apparent disparity
between Counselman and Murphy by restricting the more expansive
Counselman standard. This Note will explore initially the scope and
purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination, attempt to define the
concept of immunity in order to discuss the manifold problems sur-
rounding its operation in relation to the fifth amendment, and analyze
the interrelationship of the Counselman and Murphy decisions as well
as the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Kastigar.
II. PURPOSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND OPERATION OF
IMMUNITY LEGISLATION
A. Immunity Defined in Relation to the Fifth Amendment
The fifth amendment guarantees that no citizen shall be forced to
1. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
2. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
3. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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offer proof of his own guilt.' Although a burden upon the administration
of criminal law, the fifth amendment prohibition against self-
incrimination constitutes an effective safeguard against many potential
abuses of the criminal justice system. The primary purpose of the clause
is to forestall implementation of an inquisitorial form of justice that
would sanction the sort of reprehensible acts that occurred in England
during the period of the long struggle between Parliament and the
throne. The character of the privilege against self-incrimination is best
illustrated by its corollary principles that no witness can be compelled
to utter self-incriminating statements, and that an accused may refuse
to testify altogether. 5 Confronted with this categorical limitation upon
its investigatory power, society may be effectively foreclosed from ob-
taining testimony essential to the prosecution of a criminal defendant
and any of his accomplices. Under a grant of immunity, however, be-
cause the witness is not subject to criminal liability, he cannot invoke
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his testi-
mony therefore may be compelled under penalty of contempt. The
granting of immunity thus contemplates a balancing process in which
the need for the witness's testimony is weighed against the relative
danger to societal interests that can be expected to result from allowing
a criminal to go free.
Though clearly broad, the scope of the fifth amendment privilege
is not without some limitations. The privilege can be claimed in crimi-
nal, civil, administrative or judicial investigations, and in judicial or
administrative adjudicatory proceedings.6 Only the witness himself may
claim the privilege and then only for his own protection.7 The privilege
belongs only to natural persons; thus corporations and other abstract
4. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . .nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself .... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. For a comprehensive discussion of the scope and limitations of the fifth amendment see
E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY (1955); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2250-84
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; Corwin, The Supreme Court's Con-
struction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 191 (1930); Sobel, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination "Federalized", 31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1964).
6. The applicability of the privilege does not depend upon the nature of the proceeding in
which testimony is sought. The privilege applies both in civil and criminal proceedings, whenever
the answer might tend to subject the person claiming it to criminal responsibility. The privilege
extends to a mere witness as well as to one who is a party defendant. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266
U.S. 34, 40 (1924).
7. The privilege must be affirmatively asserted by the witness and will be deemed waived if
it is not in some manner brought to the attention of the tribunal that must pass on it. Vajtauer v.
Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927). Moreover, the privilege cannot be
asserted to protect another. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951); Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906); 8 WIGMORE, supra note 5, §§ 2259, 2270.
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legal entities cannot invoke its protection.' It can be asserted only if the
danger of criminal liability exists. Hence, it is within the discretion of
the trial judge to overrule a claim of privilege when there is no reason-
able possibility that the testimony will furnish a link in the chain of
evidence required to convict the witness of a crime.' If the danger of
criminal liability ceases, the availability of the privilege against self-
incrimination to the witness expires also. The danger of criminal liabil-
ity may terminate for any of the following reasons: running of the
applicable statute of limitations, acquittal, executive pardon, or a grant
of immunity. 0 Furthermore, the fifth amendment has not been inter-
preted to create a right to silence under the first amendment, despite the
persuasive argument that the privilege deserves recognition in order to
ensure the ability of the people to express unpopular opinions and to
maintain the secrecy of their views."
The fifth amendment shields the compulsion of real evidence as
well as parol evidence. One problem that the rule engenders is that
books and records of an individual are protected but those of the corpo-
ration are not;" it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the
8. See notes 12 & 13 infra.
9. "It is the province of the court to judge, whether any direct answer to the question, which
may be proposed, will furnish evidence against the witness.
"If such answer may disclose a fact, which forms a necessary and essential link in the chain
of testimony, which would be sufficient to convict him of any crime, he is not found to answer it
so as to furnish matter for that conviction.
"In such a case, the witness must himself judge, what his answer will be; and if he say, on
oath, that he cannot answer without accusing himself, he cannot be compelled to answer." I Burr's
Trial 245 (1808).
The trial court has the discretionary power to determine whether the witness is legitimately
relying upon the privilege. If it should ascertain that he is not, then it may compel him to answer,
and the court's decision will be overruled only upon a showing of manifest error. Mason v. United
States, 244 U.S. 362 (1917). But cf Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
10. See, e.g., Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 94 (1915).
II. The argument propounded is that under immunity grants the government is able to
secure private information concerning the beliefs and associations of its citizens and that such
activity violates the associational rights of the first amendment.
The courts have rejected this reasoning because the grant of immunity and consequent investi-
gation can be used only against criminally motivated associations. See Scales v. United States,
367 U.S. 203 (1961); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961);
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). See also McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 51 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 138, 146 (1960); Comment, Federalism and the Fifth:
Configurations of Grants of Immunity, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 561, 566 (1965). But cf Gibson v.
Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
12. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944) (books and papers of labor unions are public
papers that are without the safeguard of the fifth amendment); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)
(corporate books are public papers that are without the protection of the fifth amendment). See
also United States v. Maine Lobstermen's Ass'n, 160 F. Supp. 115 (D. Me. 1957); United States
v. Greater Kansas City Retail Coal Merchants' Ass'n, 85 F. Supp. 503 (W.D. Mo. 1949); United
States v. Consumers Ice Co., 84 F. Supp. 46 (W.D. La. 1949).
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two. i3 Records kept specifically by and in the name of a corporation,
however, are outside the aegis of the fifth amendment, and hence do not
merit the immunity privilege when produced under direction, although
they may incriminate the corporation itself or an individual who is
associated with it. Partnership documents usually are held to be within
the safeguard of the fifth amendment on the theory that a subpoena
duces tecum is merely a strategic maneuver undertaken to circumvent
the necessity of subpoenaing all of the partners and thereby to avoid
granting them each immunity.'
4
Whether the privilege against self-incrimination can be asserted in
the face of a particular sanction depends upon whether the sanction is
denominated as "penal" or "remedial" in nature. 15 If the witness is
subject to "penal" liability, then the privilege applies; if, however, he is
subject only to a "remedial" sanction, it does not. 6 The most difficult
aspect of applying the penal-remedial test is clearly one of differentiat-
ing between the two classes. A number of guidelines have been enunci-
ated to aid courts in drawing the distinction. The guidelines that have
been suggested encompass such factors as whether the loss of certain
rights accompanies specific sanctions,'17 the character of the offense
charged, 8 the legislative purpose behind a particular sanction,"6 and the
13. See, e.g., Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
14. See United States v. Linen Serv. Council, 141 F. Supp. 511 (D.N.J. 1956); United States
v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. 418 (N.D.
Cal. 1948). Contra, United States v. Onassis, 133 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
15. Note, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Consti-
tutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568, 1583 (1963). This distinction has developed under the
language of most immunity acts, which provide that "no person shall be prosecuted or subjected
to any penalty or forfeiture." See, e.g., Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 9, 38 Stat. 722.
16. The distinction between penal and remedial sanctions has been used conventionally to
determine whether criminal procedural safeguards must be available in trials. See, e.g., 1 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.13 (1958) (discussion of the due process delimitation of penal
and remedial).
17. Most levies, imposed following an adjudication of liability, can easily be categorized as
penal or remedial, but it is the relatively few marginal sanctions that cause the uncertainty and
difficulty. Disfranchisement has been thought to warrant classification of the sanction as penal.
See Note, supra note 15, at 1586.
18. The character of the act for which defendant may be found liable is also an accurate
indicium. If, for example, revocation of a license is imposed for mere incompetence, the levy is
remedial. On the other hand, if a license is revoked for wanton or wilful negligent conduct, the
levy is penal. Cf. Lee v. CAB, 225 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (dissenting opinion).
19. An additional factor, upon which the courts have relied, is the legislative purpose of the
remedy. If the intended purpose of the remedy is to achieve retribution, then it should be denomi-
nated penal. By the same token, when the levy is merely compensatory-proportionate to the
amount of injury suffered, not to the degree of malevolence displayed-it is clearly remedial in
nature. Some courts have considered these guidelines of foremost importance in distinguishing
penal from remedial sanctions. See, e.g., Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 7 (1948); Helvering
v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
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relative severity of the sanction itself.2" It should be noted that the penal-
remedial characterization is based only upon sanctions that are specifi-
cally authorized by law. The many nonlegal consequences resulting
from loss of societal favor-such as infamy, ridicule, and other public
opprobrium-generally are not considered to be penal in nature for the
purposes of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 2'
When multiple offenses are involved, questions may arise about the
specific crimes that should come within the grant of immunity. Immun-
ity generally covers only crimes to which the witness's testimony "re-
lates," rather than all crimes of which he may have been guilty at the
time of testifying.22 Moreover, before the witness's testimony can be
denominated "related" to his commission of a crime, it must be estab-
lished that his testimonial utterances are substantially connected to the
20. The magnitude and severity of the sanction itself would seem to indicate whether it is
penal or remedial, though the categorization as harsh or lenient is subject to the same arbitrariness
and uncertainty as penal or remedial.
It is important to examine some exemplary forms of relief under these judicially delineated
criteria. Injunctive relief has been held remedial because its purpose is to prevent or terminate harm
to the injured party, rather than to punish the defendant according to the degree of villainy of his
act. Bowles v. Misle, 64 F. Supp. 835 (D. Neb. 1946). In like manner, a libel in rem to condemn
food has been denominated remedial. United States v. 935 Cases More or Less, Each Containing
6 No. 10 Cans Tomato Puree, 136 F.2d 523 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 778 (1943). A suit
for enforcement of an FTC cease-and-desist order is also remedial. Drath v. FTC, 239 F.2d 452
(D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 917 (1957).
Moreover, civil damages and even treble damages that are admittedly punitive have been
labelled remedial because the purpose of the measure is not merely to punish the violator but to
deter other violators and thereby protect the public. Solomon v. United States, 276 F.2d 669, 673
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 890 (1960) (double damages authorized by statute for conspiracy
to obtain surplus property are remedial); Amato v. Porter, 157 F.2d 719, 722 (10th Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 812 (1947) (treble damages for overcharges under Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942 are remedial); Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 117 F. Supp. 747, 756
(S.D.N.Y. 1953) (treble damages under Clayton Act are remedial); Perkins Oil Well Cementing
Co. v. Owen, 293 F. 759, 761 (S.D. Cal. 1923) (treble damages for patent infringement are
remedial).
21. "The design of the constitutional privilege is not to aid the witness in vindicating his
character, but to protect him against being compelled to furnish evidence to convict him of a
criminal charge. If he secures legal immunity from prosecution, the possible impairment of his
good name is a penalty which it is reasonable he should be compelled to pay for the common good."
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 605-06 (1896).
The reasoning of the Court in Brown, however, fails to recognize that infamy is just as likely
to result from a refusal to answer the question as from testimony under immunity. It has been
suggested that even if protection of a witness from public opprobrium were one of the purposes, it
could not be accomplished by recognizing a witness' right to be silent when granted immunity. The
reasoning for this, in brief, is that some public stigma is unavoidable because the silent witness
receives the same scorn as the immunized one. See S. HOOK, COMMON SENSE AND THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT 119-20 (1957); Rogge, Compelling the Testimony of Political Deviants, 55 MICH. L.
REv. 375 (1957).
22. See Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 935-36 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
860 (1949).
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crime itself.? In this context, the elusive meaning of "substantial" has,
uncharacteristically, produced little difficulty. For example, testimony
about one of the events of a crime or testimony that would aid the state
in procuring evidence to prove a crime probably would be immunized.
Thus, the meaning of "substantial" for this purpose is broad indeed,
because immunity is granted even when the event described is an entirely
lawful one that would supply a link in the chain of evidence necessary
to establish the commission of a crime.
2 4
An award of immunity is not revocable. If the testimony of the
witness proves unfruitful, or relates merely to lawful events, or if im-
munity is improvidently granted to a despicable criminal, the grant must
nevertheless continue in force. Additionally, immunity cannot be re-
voked even if the witness falsifies testimony under oath; the witness is,
however, subject to criminal prosecution for perjury. Finally, it should
be noted that immunity is irrevocable only for past crimes; it therefore
does not insulate a witness from punishment for crimes that may occur
in the future.
2 5
B. Considerations Involved in a Decision to Grant Immunity
1. Balancing: Need for the Testimony Against Need to Prosecute
the Witness-Criminal.-The most important consideration to be
weighed in deciding whether to grant immunity is the effective protec-
tion of society. Pursuit of this policy objective necessarily implies that
the government must weigh the need for the testimony of the witness
against the possible danger to the public if the witness-criminal is per-
mitted to go free. The factors affecting this balancing process are com-
plex and will be examined in more detail.
One of the most important factors to be evaluated is the likelihood
that the witness will provide useful, detailed testimony. 26 Clearly, the
witness must possess some knowledge of the criminal activity in issue;
there otherwise would be no justification for considering him for a grant
of immunity. A second and equally important factor is whether the
23. Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 (1913).
24. Id. See also United States v. Lumber Prods. Ass'n, 42 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Cal. 1942),
rev'd as to immunity, 144 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1944). On appeal the Ninth Circuit stated:
"Where an individual is required to answer whether he participated in the negotiations of a
contract a clause of which is subsequently set forth in an indictment found against him . . .it
cannot be said that his testimony had no substantial bearing on a transaction . . . . Proof of this
portion of the contract was treated by the government as one of the vital links in the chain of
evidence summing up the existence of a conspiracy to restrain trade. ... 144 F.2d at 553.
25. United States v. Swift, 186 F. 1002 (N.D. Ill. 1911).
26. For a discussion of the type of situation in which the Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice believes that a witness will testify extensively see Note, supra note 15, at 1600.
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witness will prove to be cooperative and communicative under a grant
of immunity or whether he will limit his testimony solely to matters
about which the authorities are able to question him under the grant of
immunity. As a practical matter, when a witness who is both knowledge-
able and communicative is needed, those primarily responsible for com-
mitting an offense should not be shielded from prosecution when those
who are only incidentally culpable are available for testimony and can
be afforded immunity, since the subordinate actors are likely to be more
communicative than their less innocent fellows.2 1 In any event, regard-
less of the witness's knowledgeability, volubility, or relative guilt, the
ultimate question for determination is whether the witness's crime is so
heinous that his freedom will pose a serious threat to the safety of the
innocent public. If the crime with which the witness is charged is merely
an offense against the prevailing social and moral conventions of the
community and presents little danger to public safety or private prop-
erty, the witness should receive immunity more readily than if he had
committed an offense involving bodily injury.
28
2. When A Grant of Immunity Becomes Effective.-To deter-
mine when an immunity grant becomes effective, it is essential to exam-
ine the two fundamentally different types of immunity statutes-claim
acts and automatic acts. Under a claim act, the witness must affirma-
tively assert his privilege against self-incrimination and he then must be
specifically instructed to testify further before immunity is deemed to
have been granted.29 Claim acts are much less difficult to apply than
automatic acts because the assertion of the privilege and the grant of
immunity are usually express and unambiguous events that occur in
sequence. It is only when there is some equivocation in the interposition
of the claim or in the grant of immunity, or when there is a subsequent
waiver of immunity that problems arise. Because claim acts are de-
signed to avoid inadvertent or unintended gifts of immunity, and be-
27. A paradigm situation for immunizing those subordinately responsible in order to convict
the primary actors is when one party to a conspiracy is induced to enlist and is therefore less guilty,
relatively speaking, than the other active members of the conspiracy. In such circumstances it also
seems likely that the less guilty party would be more loquacious than one of his comrades. Id. at
1602.
28. All criminal activity is forbidden. As a practical matter, though, some crimes are more
reprehensible than others and the rank of a certain crime on the relative scale will become an
influential factor in determining whether immunity should be afforded the actor. Crimes that
involve bodily injury are clearly less desirable than those that do not. On the other hand, an offense
that is purely statutory and forbids acts that only offend prudish morals or that involve no threat
to the safety of the people should receive immunity readily. Whatever the crime, the ultimate goal
is to protect the innocent in the most effective way.
29. See. e.g., Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, § 22, 48 Stat. 87.
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cause the government controls the proceedings, courts generally con-
strue doubtful statements in favor of a grant of immunity."
Under an automatic act, the witness is granted immunity simply
by testifying under oath in response to a subpoena.3' Because of the
manner in which immunity is conferred, automatic acts give rise to
troublesome factual issues that are usually resolved in favor of the
witness. For example, a witness who is testifying only about lawful acts
in response to cautiously framed questions may unexpectedly utter addi-
tional incriminating testimony either through inadvertence or through
a deliberate attempt to gain immunity automatically for his crimes.
3 1
Only if the investigating official retains firm control over the proceed-
ings and interrupts the testimony to inform the witness that any further
incriminating statements will be construed as a waiver of the fifth
amendment can the government prevent this sort of abuse.
In addition to problems that arise under either claim acts or auto-
matic acts, difficult problems are encountered when both types of acts
apply to a single testimonial event. When the matters related by the
witness are concerned with more than one area of criminal activity and,
30. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949). In that case, an OPA investigator
erroneously informed Smith that he could not be compelled to testify, but Smith nevertheless
asserted his privilege. After answering several questions, the following was recorded:
Q. "This is a voluntary statement. You do not claim immunity with respect to that state-
ment?"
A. "No."
Subsequently Smith was indicted and convicted of violating the Emergency Price Control Act
despite a plea of immunity. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the government contended that Smith
had waived his privilege because the "No," referred to the second sentence by the investigator.
Smith argued that it had been in answer to the first part of the question. The Court conceded that
the privilege, once claimed, could be subsequently waived, but a waiver of a constitutional right,
after that right had been validly asserted, could not be inferred from vague and uncertain evidence.
31. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 9, 38 Stat. 723. Prior to 1943, some of the
lower federal courts gave automatic and claim acts identical treatment by requiring a claim of
privilege before immunity would be deemed granted under either act. See Johnson v. United States,
5 F.2d 471, 477-78 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 574 (1925); United States v. Greater N.Y.
Live Poultry Chamber of Commerce, 33 F.2d 1005, 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), cert. denied, 283 U.S.
837 (1931); United States v. Lay Fish Co., 13 F.2d 136, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1926). Contra, United
States v. Ward, 295 F. 576 (W.D. Wash. 1924); United States v. Pardue, 294 F. 543 (S.D. Tex.
1923).
In 1943, however, the Supreme Court held that under an automatic act immunity is granted
irrespective of whether the witness had claimed his privilege. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S.
424 (1943).
32. A smilar problem may arise under an automatic act when a witness, who is required to
identify records compelled by a subpoena duces tecum, inadvertently or consciously testifies be-
yond the bounds of mere identification to matters that would invoke an automatic grant of
immunity. See. e.g., United States v. Maine Lobstermen's Ass'n, 160 F. Supp. 115 (D. Me. 1957);
United States v. Detroit Sheet Metal and Roofing Contractor's Ass'n, 116 F. Supp. 81 (E.D. Mich.
1953).
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thus, may be governed by more than one type of immunity act, the
relative scope of each act must be defined to determine which act has
primary jurisdiction.33 A situation in which a witness clearly meets the
requirements of a claim act may present little difficulty, because if the
witness has fulfilled the strictures of a claim act, he has clearly complied
with the less stringent demands of an automatic act. On the other hand,
it is possible for a witness to satisfy the criteria for receiving immunity
under an automatic act and at the same time fail to qualify under a
claim act. In order to determine whether an automatic or a claim act
controls in such a situation, it is probably necessary to look to the nature
of the subject matter of the investigation. If the subject matter of the
proceedings is substantially related to a violation covered by a statute
that confers automatic immunity, then the witness should be granted
immunity. This standard affords the same judicial latitude, and in view
of a judicial tendency to declare that immunity has been afforded in all
marginal cases, 34 the standard seems well-conceived and just.
III. THE TRANSACTIONAL VERSUS TESTIMONIAL IMMUNITY
DICHOTOMY
A. Evolution of the Transactional-Testimonial Dispute
1. Development of the Transactional Immunity Standard.-The
original federal immunity statute-the Immunity Act of 1857 35 -was
enacted in reaction to widespread rumors of congressional corruption. 31
33. In United States v. Niarchos, 125 F. Supp. 214 (D.D.C. 1954), defendant Casey entered
a plea of immunity based upon testimony compelled before a grand jury investigating violations
of the Shipping Act, an automatic act. The government countered that the grand jury was only
investigating violations of 2 other statutes, which were claim acts. The grand jury indictments were
for alleged conspiracy and false claims made to avoid certain provisions of the Shipping Act. The
court found that the subject matter of the investigation grew out of the Shipping Act, and concluded
that the witness had received automatic immunity.
The Niarchos court attempted to articulate a manageable test: "The test clearly cannot be
that the indictment must be brought under. . . whatever act contains an immunity provision. The
result of a special grand jury investigation often indicates violations of different or additional laws
than those on which the proceeding was initially 'based'. The words 'growing out of' must be given
their common sense meaning . . . . [T]he proper test for determining the nature of the proceeding
for the purposes of an immunity provision is the nature of its subject matter." 125 F. Supp. at
220. See also, Marcus v. United States, 310 F.2d 143, (3d Cir. 1962), cerl. denied, 372 U.S. 944
(1963).
34. The Marcus and Niarchos courts demonstrated a proclivity for resolving any equivoca-
tion in favor of the witness, because governmental authorities are in charge of the proceedings and
should bear the responsibility for mistakes or ambiguity. Thus, if the government were to prevail
in these circumstances, any attempt to construe an equivocal statement or situation against the
witness would permit trickery and subterfuge to become a regular part of such proceedings.
35. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, 11 Stat. 155.
36. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 274 (1857).
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Hastily and haphazardly constructed, the statute was designed to pro-
vide an immediate means of exposing the illicit conduct of certain con-
gressmen. The Act, employing somewhat imprecise wording, granted
immunity to the witness "for any fact or act touching which he shall be
required to testify. ' 37 Ironically, the broad statutory language provided
many of the witnesses whom the Act was intended ultimately to convict
with effective insulation from criminal liability."
In reaction to the unintended generosity of the Act of 1857, Con-
gress enacted the Immunity Act of 186231 in order to limit the broad
scope of the 1857 Act. The 1862 Act narrowed the potential range of
the grant by providing immunity only from use of the testimony it-
self-less than full testimonial immunity. Under the 1862 Act, law en-
forcement officials had been free to use the fruits of testimony in their
investigations. This meant that the witness could be prosecuted in a
subsequent proceeding based on evidence discovered as an indirect result
of the testimony offered at another proceeding. The expansive sweep of
the Act of 1857 was thus markedly restricted by the enactment of the
1862 Act.
The Immunity Act of 186840 amended the Immunity Act of 1862
in one significant respect. The 1862 Act's provision for immunity grants
in congressional hearings was broadened to make immunity available
in "any judicial proceeding" as well. The degree of immunity permitted,
however, was left unchanged. Thus under the 1862 and 1868 Acts the
"immunity baths"41 that had been accorded the herds of witnesses that
flocked to congressional committee rooms to offer testimony-and ob-
tain protection from criminal liability-were ended. From the applica-
tion of the statutes, however, arose the serious question whether the
1862 and 1868 Acts conferred immunity in sufficient degree to avoid
37. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, § 2, 11 Stat. 156.
38. Many of the nefarious characters who were intended to be convicted for their crimes
rushed to the congressional committee rooms to receive general absolution. The irony of such
developments was soon recognized by Senator Trumbull:
"The Statute of 1857 was passed hastily; we all recollect that it grew out of a particular matter,
and was known to be imperfect when it was passed. It has operated so as to discharge from
prosecution and punishment persons who were brought before these committees and testified
touching matters that they might have been prosecuted for. In fact this holds out an inducement
for the worst criminals to appear before our investigating committees. Here is a man who stole
two million in bonds, if you please, out of the Interior Department. What does he do? He gets
himself called as a witness before one of the investigating committees and testifies something in
relation to that matter, and then he cannot be indicted." CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 428
(1862).
39. Act of Jan. 24, 1862, ch. I1, 12 Stat. 333.
40. Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, 15 Stat. 37.
41. See note 40 supra.
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invalidation under the fifth amendment self-incrimination clause. The
first federal cases to consider the issue held that "use" of immunity
satisfies the requirements of the fifth amendment. In re Phillips" held
that a witness who had declined to answer questions regarding tax re-
turns from tobacco manufacturers could be compelled to testify under
a grant of use immunity. Between 1871 and 1883, three more federal
cases in which the courts confronted the issue produced similar hold-
ings. 3
In 1892, Counselman v. Hitchcock" presented the Supreme Court
with the question whether the Act of 1868 was unconstitutional because
it provided only use immunity. The issue arose because the Act of 1868
had been applied by the courts in the developing area of interstate
commerce regulation, and thus had generated many cases in which
witnesses before the Interstate Commerce Commission asserted the pro-
tection of the fifth amendment despite a grant of immunity in accord-
ance with the statute. The defendant in Counselman, an interstate ship-
per of grain, invoked the fifth amendment by refusing to testify about
a violation of the Interstate Commerce Act, and was consequently con-
victed of contempt. On final appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the
government's contention that use immunity fully protects a witness in
any criminal case from being compelled to testify against himself. The
Court reasoned that use immunity alone could not prevent prosecutors
from employing a witness's testimony to discover other evidence, which
could be used against the witness to secure an otherwise unobtainable
conviction. 5 After formulating the broad constitutional proposition that
a grant of immunity must be "coextensive" with the fifth amendment,
the Supreme Court stated more specifically that, in order to satisfy
the "coextensive" test, the provision "must afford absolute immunity
42. 19 F. Cas. 506 (No. 11,097) (D. Va. 1869).
43. United States v. Farrington, 5 F. 343 (N.D.N.Y. 1881); United States v. Williams, 28
F. Cas. 670 (No. 16,717) (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1872); United States v. Brown, 24 F. Cas. 1273 (No.
14,671) (D. Ore. 1871). A representative statement was that of the court in United States v.
Williams: "If the testimony or admission cannot be used by giving it directly in evidence to the
jury as an admission, or if it cannot, in any manner, be used against the party, then it seems to
me the great reason upon which the protection of the witness rests has ceased to exist; and it is a
well settled principle, too old to be combated [sic] or denied, that where the reason of a law or
rule has ceased, the law or rule itself ceases also." 28 F. Cas. at 671.
44. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
45. Justice Blatchford, speaking for the majority, observed about use immunity: "It could
not, and would not, prevent the use of his testimony to search out other testimony to be used in
evidence against him or his property, in a criminal proceeding [in any United States] court. It could
not prevent the obtaining and the use of witnesses and evidence which should be attributable
directly to testimony he might give under compulsion, and on which he might be convicted, when
otherwise, and if he had refused to answer, he could not possibly have been convicted." Id. at 564.
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against future prosecution for the offence to which the question re-
lates."46
Although the Court's holding in Counselman was viewed as the
final constitutional word on the immunity issue, until at least the
1960's," the Court's pronouncements were to some extent superfluous,
since the only question requiring resolution in that case was whether use
immunity was sufficient to avert condemnation under the fifth amend-
ment. The Counselman holding thus clearly established that a bare
standard of use immunity violates the fifth amendment; its "absolute
immunity" language, however, was apparently set out as the Court's
view of a constitutionally satisfactory standard for legislative drafting."
Adopting terminology suggested by the Supreme Court in Counselman,
Congress enacted the requirement that "no person shall be prosecuted
or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any trans-
action, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify," into the
Immunity Act of 1893.11
The 1893 Act was subsequently declared invalid by a federal dis-
trict court because the Act failed to provide immunity from public
odium and other seeming "penalties" of testifying." In 1896, however,
in Brown v. Walker,5' the Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of the
district court and held that the transactional immunity afforded by the
1893 Act was coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination.
Endorsing the transactional immunity standard of the Act, the Court
46. Id. at 586.
47. See notes 62-76 infra and accompanying text.
48. "[A] statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity . 142 U.S.
at 586.
49. Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443. Congressional response to Counselman was
immediate and accommodating. The relevant portions of the Act provide: "[N]o person shall be
excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agree-
ments and documents before the Interstate Commerce Commission, or in obedience to the sub-
poena of the Commission, whether such subpoena be signed or issued by one or more Commission-
ers, or in any cause or proceeding, criminal or otherwise, based upon or growing out of any alleged
violation of the act of Congress, entitled, 'An act to regulate commerce,' approved February fourth,
eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, or of any statement thereof on the ground or for the reason
that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him, may tend to criminate
him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. But no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to
any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which
he may testify, or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, before said Commission, or in
obedience to its subpoena, or the subpoena of either of them, or in any case or proceeding .... "
50. United States v. James, 61 F. 257 (N.D. I1. 1894). In this case, Judge Grosscup said of
immunity: "The stated penalties and forfeitures of the law might be set aside; but was there no
pain in disfavor and odium among neighbors, in excommunication from church or socieities that
might be governed by the prevailing views, . . . or in the unfathomable disgrace, not susceptible
of formulation in language, which a known violation of law brings upon the offender?" Id. at 264.
51. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
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held that the grant must extend to any transaction; the state courts as
well as the federal were therefore foreclosed from subsequently prose-
cuting the recipient of immunity.52 Four Justices dissented from the
majority opinion, not because they thought something less than transac-
tional immunity would satisfy the coextensive requirement, but rather
because the 1893 Act did not afford, according to their view, a sufficient
degree of immunity under the Counselman mandate, as the district
court had already held.5 3 Thus, the transactional standard unquestion-
ably reflected the position of the entire Court. The rule announced in
Counselman and thereafter buttressed in Brown v. Walker was reiter-
ated frequently during the first half of the twentieth century.54
2. Erosion of the Transactional Immunity Standard.-Although
transactional immunity remained the prevailing standard following the
Counselman decision,55 application of the broad requirements of the
transactional rule created jurisdictional difficulties. First, because the
fifth amendment had not then been made applicable to the states, there
was doubt about whether the standard pronounced in Counselman also
compelled the states to afford transactional immunity to testifying wit-
nesses. More recently, Malloy v. Hogan56 has unequivocably resolved
that question by extending the fifth amendment self-incrimination
clause to the states. Secondly, it was uncertain whether the federal
government could immunize a witness against state prosecution, and
52. The Court stated in this regard: "[T]he immunity extends to any transaction, matter or
thing concerning which he may testify, which clearly indicates that the immunity is intended to be
general, and to be applicable whenever and in whatever court such prosecution may be had." Id.
at 608. The Court's statements were not binding, however, and the question whether the transac-
tional immunity standard is applicable to the states and whether one jurisdiction can guarantee
immunity in the other's boundaries still haunts the Supreme Court. See also notes 58-60 infra and
accompanying text.
53. The dissenting opinions endorsed the lower court's finding that the fifth amendment is
at least partially intended to guard against forcing a witness to suffer public disgrace by compelling
him to testify under immunity. 161 U.S. at 621-28 (Shiras, Gray & White, JJ., dissenting); id. at
630-33 (Field, J., dissenting). See also Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 443-55 (1956)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
54. See, e.g., Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 144 (1913); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 67 (1906).
55. See, e.g., Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956). Defendant refused to answer
before a federal grand jury investigating threats to national security. The district attorney asked
the district court to order Ullmann to answer under the Immunity Act of 1954. Ullmann contended
that because the immunity provided does not protect against state prosecution, the grant violates
the fifth amendment. The Supreme Court on appeal rejected Ullmann's argument, reaffirmed
Brown v. Walker, and upheld the transactional immunity provision of the Immunity Act of 1954.
56. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). For a summary of the Malloy holding see notes 59-62 infra and
accompanying text.
57. The Court, however, had held otherwise before Malloy in such cases as Knapp v.
Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 379-80 (1958), and Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
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conversely, whether the state could immunize a witness from federal
prosecution if required to do so.
Though often ambiguously so, the Supreme Court has held repeat-
edly that the jurisdictional division of federal and state governments was
inviolable by either body. The most lucid articulation of the Court's
position appeared in United States v. Murdock,58 in which the Court
noted initially the inapplicability of the fifth amendment to the states
and secondly the sacrosanct separation of federal and state government,
holding that a federal witness could not refuse to testify on the basis that
his testimony could be used against him under state law.59 The dual
standard propounded by the Court in Murdock, the "two-sovereignties
rule," although intended as a remedy for uncertainty, produced prob-
lems of its own. A witness who had been granted full transactional
immunity from federal prosecution could nevertheless be convicted in
state court for the same offense. Conversely, a state witness who had
been granted transactional immunity within state boundaries could be
prosecuted by federal authorities for the same criminal activity. The
witness therefore would be confronted with a Hobson's choice between
possible prosecution in another jurisdiction and a contempt citation for
refusing to testify.6" Furthermore, the manifest purpose of the fifth
amendment is undermined when a witness who is forced to testify under
immunity in one jurisdiction can, through the collaboration of law en-
forcement agencies, be compelled to prove his own guilt in another
jurisdiction on the basis of testimony elicited at another trial under
threat of contempt citation. Despite the many difficulties associated
with the two-sovereignties rule, 1 it remained the governing precept until
1964. In Malloy v. Hogan2 and Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of
New York Harbor,13 however, the Court set out to remedy some of the
58. 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
59. But cf Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954). There the Court ruled upon whether
Congress could extend immunity to state proceedings: "Little need be said about the contention
that Congress lacks power to bar state courts from convicting a person for crime on the basis of
evidence he has given to help the national legislative bodies carry on their governmental functions.
Congress has power to summon witnesses before either House or before their committees." Id. at
183.
60. Although the transactional immunity standard was a necessary and commendable step
toward insuring the integrity of the fifth amendment, the implementation of the standard through
the irrational two-sovereignties rule served only to substitute one problem for another. Under the
rule a witness could either testify under quasi-immunity and run the risk of being prosecuted and
convicted in the other jurisdiction, or he could simply refuse to answer and incur a penalty for
contempt. Such a predicament is alarmingly similar to an attempt to force him to prove his own
guilt.
61. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
62. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
63. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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untoward implications of two-sovereignties rule. Malloy opened a new
and confusing era in the development of immunity jurisprudence. The
Court in Malloy extended the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination to state proceedings by incorporating that clause into the
fourteenth amendment due process clause. 4 Although Malloy effec-
tively overruled Murdock and the view that the fifth amendment is
inapplicable to the states, the decision did not acceptably resolve two-
sovereignties problems because the questions whether the federal gov-
ernment could grant immunity from state prosecution and whether the
state could bestow immunity from federal action were not raised. The
Court, however, did express an opinion about the two-sovereignties
question: "It would be incongruous to have different standards deter-
mine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared
prosecution, depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or
federal court. Therefore, the same standards must determine whether an
accused's silence in either a federal or state proceeding is justified." 5
The stage, thus, had been set for a wholesale rejection of the two-
sovereignties principle.
Recognizing that it had not fully resolved the two-sovereignties
issue, the Supreme Court, on the same day it decided Malloy, attempted
to resolve the jurisdictional dispute in Murphy v. Waterfront Commis-
sion of New York Harbor.6 The Murphy Court acknowledged the con-
stitutional power of the federal government to immunize a witness
against state prosecution under the concept of federalism." On this
basis, the Court found that the federal government is required by the
fifth amendment to grant immunity from state as well as federal prose-
cution. The Court conceded, however, that unique considerations, such
as those confronting the Court in the Murphy case, must be evaluated
in deciding whether the state is compelled to confer transactional im-
munity from federal prosecution. In Murphy, witnesses had refused to
testify under the fifth amendment before the state-enabled Waterfront
Commission of New York Harbor, which was investigating waterfront
work stoppages. The Commission granted the witnesses immunity from
prosecution in New York and New Jersey, but they again declined to
64. In words portentous to immunity legislation Justice Brennan, for the majority, said:
"The State urges, however, that the availability of the federal privilege to a witness in a state
inquiry is to be determined according to a less stringent standard than is applicable in a federal
proceeding. We disagree. . . .The Court thus has rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment applies to the States only a 'watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of
the Bill of Rights'...." 378 U.S. at 10-1I.
65. 378 U.S. at I1.
66. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
67. See note 76 infra.
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testify on the ground that the testimony could be used to incriminate
them in a federal court because, under the two-sovereignties rule, the
state could not grant immunity from federal prosecution. The Court
formulated the issue before it in the following terms: "[W]hether one
jurisdiction within our federal structure may compel a witness, whom
it has immunized from prosecution under its laws, to give testimony
Which might then be used to convict him of a crime against another
jurisdiction.""8 Explaining that the unique consideration of federalism
arises when the state attempts to immunize a witness from prosecution,
the Court declared:
[W]e hold the constitutional rule to be that a state witness may not be compelled
to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless the com-
pelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in
connection with a criminal prosecution against him. We conclude, moreover, that
in order to implement this constitutional rule and accomodate the interests of the
State and Federal Governments in investigating and prosecuting crime, the Federal
Government must be prohibited from making any such use of compelled testimony
and. its fruits. This exclusionary rule, while permitting the States to secure informa-
tion necessary for effective law enforcement, leaves the witness and the Federal
Government in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed his
privilege in the absence of a state grant of immunity.6
The Court's holding in Murphy apparently demands a grant of
transactional immunity by the federal government that will transcend
jurisdictional boundaries to proscribe state as well as federal prosecu-
tion. The rule enunciated by the Court does not have the same effect in
the context of state immunity grants. In sustaining a state statute pro-
viding testimonial immunity, the Court held by implication that a state
must grant a witness transactional immunity within its own jurisdiction,
but, in deference to principles of federalism, the state cannot grant more
than testimonial immunity from federal prosecution. Mr. Justice Gold-
berg, speaking for the majority in Murphy, found that withholding the
use of the state testimony and its fruits from federal exploitation would
provide a standard "coextensive" with the fifth amendment privilege.7
Several fundamentally incorrect propositions appear to underlie
the Murphy exclusionary rule. First, the Murphy standard overlooks the
view expressed by the Court in Malloy that "it would be incongruous
to have different standards determine the validity" of a grant of immun-
ity, "depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal
court."71 Clearly, under the Murphy exclusionary rule the immunity
68. 378 U.S. at 53.
69. 378 U.S. at 79 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted).
70. 478 U.S. at 79 n.18.
71. See note 64 supra.
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standard applicable to federal proceedings is at variance with that appl-
icable at the state level.
Secondly, that portion of the Murphy rule governing state immun-
ity provisions does not comport with the Counselman guideline of trans-
actional immunity, because only testimonial immunity is offered by the
state from federal prosecution. Mr. Justice Goldberg extracted from
Counselman language to the effect that it would be possible under the
Constitution to permit only use and fruits immunity if it could be as-
sured that any evidence subsequently used to prosecute the witness arose
from an independent legitimate source.7 2 He ignored, however, the
Counselman Court's finding that the risk of abuse inherent in such a
loosely formulated standard warrants a more protective rule.7 3 He also
failed to take account of the Counselman holding that "no statute which
leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution" effectively supplants
the fifth amendment privilege.
74
Thirdly, the Murphy exclusionary rule presupposes that testimonial
immunity will be sufficient to protect the witness once he has made
incriminating statements, which seems to overlook the possibility that
the testimony could be used to discover other evidence that would rot
come within the scope of testimonial immunity. If that possibility did
not exist, the Murphy exclusionary rule would be equivalent to the
Counselman transactional standard. The Counselman Court, however,
found that it was not.7 5 Fourthly, the concept of federalism, which
prompted the exclusionary rule in the first place, contemplates that the
states will have no power to compel or prevent federal action. If this
concept is to be followed to its logical end, the states should not even
be able to prevent federal use of the testimony or its fruits. 76 The
72. Mr. Justice Goldberg ruled that to meet the Counselman test the state must immunize
the testimony only, with the further limitation on both state and federal governments that each
could prosecute the witness only by "showing that their evidence is not tainted by establishing that
they had an independent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence." 378 U.S. at 79 n.18.
73. The Counselman Court considered the risk of abuse of testimonial immunity and found
the risk to be of such magnitude as to render testimonial immunity inadequate under the fifth
amendment. See note 45 supra.
74. Considering the identical question whether testimonial immunity could avoid the censor-
ship of the fifth amendment the Counselman Court had held:
"We are clearly of opinion that no statute which leaves the party or witness subject to
prosecution after he answers the criminating question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting
the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United States .... In view of the constitutional
provision, a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prose-
cution for the offense to which the question relates." 142 U.S. at 585-86.
75. Id.
76. Federalism is rooted in the basic concept of government found throughout the Constitu-
tion. It does not have its foundation in any one specific grant of authority, though the supremacy
clause is notably similar to such a grant. The formula simply states that the federal government
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Murphy exclusionary rule, however, represents a compromise of consti-
tutional principles to permit the states some freedom of investigative
action. The rule carries the implication that federalism is not in reality
as compelling a consideration as was stated in Murphy, since a strict
application of that concept would forbid the states from granting any
degree of immunity from federal prosecution.
3. Murphy's Effect on the Transactional Standard: The Diver-
gent Theories.-Since the Murphy decision, various theories have been
propounded that purportedly define or explain the impact of the
Murphy decision on the Counselman holding. First, one might argue
that Murphy had no effect at all upon the vitality of the Counselman
rule. Two significant cases appear superficially to sustain this first posi-
tion. One year after the Supreme Court decided Murphy, the Court
reaffirmed the Counselman test in Albertson v. Subversive Activities
Control Board (SA CB).7 7 In that case, a federal witness had refused to
register under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950.78 In up-
holding the witness's right to refuse to answer, the Court relied upon
its holding in Counselman to conclude that immunity under the Subver-
sive Activities Control Act "is not complete." The Albertson case, how-
ever, does not really lend support to the proposition that Murphy had
no effect on Counselman, because the immunity grant in Albertson was
to a federal witness and the problem of federalism, which produced the
Murphy exclusionary rule, did not arise. One year after Albertson was
decided, in Stevens v. Marks,79 the Supreme Court again invoked the
Counselman standard by implication, but, as in Albertson, the issue of
whether the state must afford transactional or testimonial immunity was
not before the Court.8" Therefore, it should be reemphasized that the
cannot be forced to act or forbear to act by a state or local government unless the federal
government consents to be. Federalism in its purest form would forestall state action to grant any
degree of immunity from federal prosecution. For a general discussion see Beth, The Supreme
Court and American Federalism, 10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 376 (1966).
77. 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
-78. Act of Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987.
79. 383 U.S. 234 (1966).
80. The witness, a member of the N.Y. City Police Department, was summarily discharged.
He was then subpoenaed before a New York County grand jury. Before entering the grand jury
room, an assistant district attorney advised him to sign a waiver of immunity, otherwise he would
be subject to removal from public office. The witness signed the waiver. In a later proceeding before
a different grand jury, the witness refused to waive his immunity. As a consequence, he was dis-
charged as a police officer. Though the question of whether transactional immunity is required was
not at issue, the Court stated peripherally:
"We need not stop to determine whether the immunity said to be conferred here ... consti-
tutes that 'absolute immunity against further prosecution' about which the Court spoke in
Counselman v. Hitchcock [citation omitted], and which the Court said was necessary if the privi-
lege were to be constitutionally supplanted. . . . For . . . he was led to believe . . . that no
immunity provisions were applicable to his case." 383 U.S. at 244-45.
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Albertson and Stevens cases constitute extremely shallow authority for
the view that Murphy had no effect on Counselman.
The Albertson and Stevens decisions also seem t6 undermine the
persuasiveness of a second theory about the effect of Murphy on
Counselman-a view that holds that Murphy sub silentio overruled
Counselman.8 1 This position is subject to challenge on two bases. First,
Albertson and Stevens were both decided after Murphy and in each the
Court reiterated the applicability of the transactional immunity stan-
dard in those instances in which the federal government is the immuniz-
ing body. Thus, Counselman could hardly have been overruled by the
Murphy decision or the Supreme Court would not have relied upon the
Counselman holding in cases that succeeded Murphy. Secondly, the
majority opinion in Murphy clearly acknowledged the vitality of the
Counselman rule in relation to federal grants of immunity, but the
Court also recognized that the rule had been compromised for state
grants in order to preserve the sanctity of federalism. 2 Therefore, the
Murphy Court formulated, at most, an exception to the still-reigning
Counselman test. In 1968, however, the Supreme Court handed down
five decisions that have subsequently been cited as authority for the
proposition that Murphy sub silentio overruled Counselman. In
Gardner v. Broderick,84 a case involving a state investigatory proceed-
ing, the Court, citing both Counselman and Murphy as authority and
employing imprecise language, concluded in dictum that a witness may
be compelled to testify if "there is immunity from federal and state use
of the compelled testimony or its fruits in connection with a criminal
prosecution against the person testifying. ' '8 5 The witness in Gardner was
not granted immunity in any degree. Thus, the Court was not forced to
decide the two-sovereignties issue presented in Murphy, but rather the
simpler question whether the fifth amendment, under the circumstances,
required that any form of immunity be granted. 6 In Marchetti v. United
States,37 a federal witness had refused to report his gambling activity
income to the Internal Revenue Service. As in Gardner, the witness was
81. See note 93 infra.
82. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
83. Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968);
Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968); Grosso
v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
84. 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
85. 392 U.S. at 276.
86. When immunity is refused altogether, the tribunal has only to determine whether the fifth
amendment requires that the witness be afforded immunity. The court is not compelled to deter-
mine what degree of immunity must be granted.
87. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
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not granted immunity; the Court, therefore, had only to determine
whether the witness could be compelled to register. Nevertheless, the
Court included in its opinion an unnecessary reference to Murphy,
which, of course, involved a state immunity statute., Gardner and
Marchetti are representative examples of the five 1968 cases in which
immunity was not granted to any of the witnesses, and in which the
question whether testimonial or transactional immunity is required was
not even raised. Therefore, despite the language of the cases, they
clearly do not support the proposition that Murphy sub silentio over-
ruled Counselman.
A third view that has been formulated to explain the impact of
Murphy on Counselman is that the Supreme Court's statements in
Counselman were precatory, rather than mandatory in nature. Section
201 of the Organized Crime Control Act of 19709 was enacted as the
result of partial reliance upon this theory. Congress, impressed by a
mounting wave of criminal activity in the late 1960's, decided that re-
form of the existing federal immunity structure was an appropriate
remedial reaction. 0 Prior to the enactment of section 201, federal im-
munity provisions had been contained in 57 disparate statutes," each
usually consisting of a specific grant of power to a particular federal
agency. One of the purposes of section 201 was to harmonize all 57
88. 390 U.S. at 58.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970) provides: "Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before
or ancillary to-(l) a court or grand jury of the United States, (2) an agency of the United States,
or (3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a committee or a
subcommittee of either House, and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the
witness an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on
the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information com-
pelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or
other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for
perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order." (emphasis sup-
plied).
90. During the 1960's, despite at least token attempts to arrest the trend, organized crime
expanded its operations at an alarming rate. Many members of Congress and other public figures
vocalized their distress over the problem to congressional committees that were sitting to determine
the appropriate course of action to combat this crime wave. One of their actions was to rewrite
federal immunity legislation. See Hearings on S. 30 Before Subcomm. 5 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 27, at 81 (1970). (statement of John L. McClellan).
Attorney General John N. Mitchell said of the problem: "Over the last four decades, a
criminal minority has put together in the United States an organization which is both an illicit
cartel and a nationwide confederation, operating with comparative immunity from our criminal
laws, and in derogation of our traditional concepts of free enterprise." Id. at 152. For a detailed
factual report on organized crime in society see S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1969).
91. For a catalogue of the 57 federal immunity statutes repealed by § 201 see the listing
following Organized Crime Control Bill of 1970, § 201, 18 U.S.C.A. § 6002 (Supp. 1971).
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statutes and centralize them into a single law . 2 Section 201 essentially
provides that a witness who has interposed his privilege against self-
incrimination may be forced to testify, but that no "testimony or other
information" compelled under the order or "any information directly
or indirectly derived from such testimony" may be used against the
witness. Important among the factors that motivated Congress to pass
section 201 were reports by several authorities that Counselman had
been sub silentio overruled by Murphy and that the Counselman rule
was mere dicta.1 The courts have unanimously rejected this argument
on two grounds. First, the Supreme Court in Counselman, though not
faced with the question whether transactional immunity is required,
apparently thought that the practical difficulties of legislative drafting
necessitated a statement defining the degree of immunity that would
satisfy the requirements of the fifth amendment. Later decisions have
characterized the Counselman language as mandatory authority. Sec-
ondly, even if the Counselman statements were precatory in nature when
issued, they have become binding authority through subsequent Su-
preme Court cases. In Brown v. Walker the Court, relying on
Counselman, clearly held that transactional immunity is imperative
under the fifth amendment.94 In several other cases decided after
Walker, most notably in Ullmann v. United States,95 the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the standard promulgated in Counselman. Congress
adopted section 201 in the mistaken belief that the Counselman test
constituted no more than dicta and that Murphy had sub silentio over-
ruled Counselman. It failed to observe that the Murphy holding that
92. Id.
93. It is clear that Congress intended § 201 to embody the Murphy standard, though they
failed to accurately discern what that standard is: "Refusal to testify following communication of
the immunity order warrants contempt proceedings. No oral testimony or other information
secured from a witness can be used against him in a criminal proceeding. This statutory immunity
is intended to be as broad as, but no broader than, the privilege against self-incrimination [citation
omitted]. It is designed to reflect the use-restriction immunity concept of Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission [citation omitted] rather [than] the transaction immunity concept of Counselman v.
Hitchcock [citation omitted]. The witness is also protected against the use of evidence derivatively
obtained." H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1970).
One reason for the use of this distorted version of the Murphy rule was the belief that Murphy
had sub silentio overruled Counselman. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1969); accord,
DEP'T OF JUSTICE COMMENTS ON S. 30, S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1969).
Moreover, the view that Counselman's statements on transactional immunity were dicta has
received some small following in the Congress. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 11157 and H.R. 12041
Before Subcomm. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1969). See
also In re Korman, 449 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 406 U.S. 952 (1972); Stewart v. United
States, 440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 971 (1971); In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp.
407 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 406 U.S. 952 (1972) (government's contentions); note 100 infra.
94. 161 U.S. at 594.
95. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
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testimonial immunity will suffice was issued in the context of evaluating
the effect of a state statute on the degree of immunity available in
federal jurisdictions. Section 201 manifested an attempt by Congress to
use the Murphy rationale as a justification for authorizing federal grants
of use and. fruits immunity that were not dictated by considerations of
federalism. Some authorities, including federal administrative agencies,
vigorously objected to section 201 because of its ill-founded reliance
upon Murphy" and because continued adherence to section 201 would
severely restrict the investigative power of the federal government;"7
these authorities, however, were largely disregarded.
A fourth theory that explains the Murphy impact on Counselman"
presents the decisions as requiring transactional immunity when the
federal government is the original grantor of immunity. Conversely, the
state must afford transactional immunity within its own jurisdiction; the
state cannot, however, because of the demands of federalism, grant
96. Vociferous critics of § 201 attacked the premise of proponents of the measure on the
basis that Counselman was clearly not dicta and that the Murphy rule was merely a concession to
facilitate federalism. Minority Views of Hon. William F. Ryan on H.R. 1157, H.R. REP. No. 1188,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41 (1970); accord, 116 CONG. REC. 853 (1970) (letter from the American
Civil Liberties Union to each member of the Senate).
Beyond the merely legal arguments, the opponents of § 201 examined the practical inadequa-
cies of testimonial immunity: "The Bill fails to take any cognizance of the fact that it is virtually
impossible to establish tainted evidence-that is, evidence that has been developed from leads
which appeared from the compelled testimony or information of the immunized witness. Very
simply, to elevate use immunity to general law is to declare a moratorium on the effectiveness of
the fifth amendment and to leave it moribund. It is not difficult to mask evidence so that it appears
to have been developed independently of the immunized witness' testimony or information.
"Even though, technically, the burden is usually on the prosecution to disprove taint, as a
practical matter it works the other way. Courts have both evoked doctrines and made findings in
related areas which show how feeble such an alleged protection is. In many instances, courts have
ruled that, where the taint is 'attenuated,' the derivative evidence is admissible. Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Some courts have ruled that if the evidence could have been obtained
from an independent source, it will be admitted. Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963). Some courts have ruled that the testimony of witnesses whose
names have been obtained unconstitutionally is not excludable because too remote and 'atten-
uated.'" Minority Views of Hon. William F. Ryan on H.R. 11157, H.R. REP. No. 1188, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1970).
97. The federal agencies that depend upon their investigatory powers to police compliance
or non-compliance with their regulations were alarmed at the testimonial immunity provision of
§ 201. For example, in a letter to Senator James 0. Eastland, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation expressed severe distress, because they feared the corporation would not be able to
carry on its important investigative functions under the less protective and less attractive grant in
§ 201. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 132 (1969).
98. See Wendel, Compulsory Immunity Legislation and the Fifth Amendment Privilege:
New Developments and New Confusion, 10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 327 (1966); Comment, State Im-
munity Statutes in Constitutional Perspective; 1968 DUKE L.J. 311; Note, Federalism and the
Fifth: Configurations of Grants of Immunity, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 561 (1965); 24 VAND. L. REV.
815 (1971).
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more than testimonial immunity within federal jurisdiction. Several fac-
tors militate in favor of the fourth view. First, although Counselman
established the governing standard for both federal aid state govern-
ments, application of the unqualified Counselman rule produced prob-
lems of federalism because the states are not empowered to dictate legal
results to the federal government. The initial response to this problem
was the two-sovereignties rule. The rule generated such prodigious diffi-
culties of its own, however, that it was abandoned in favor of the
Murphy standard. The Court in the Murphy decision simply forged an
"exception" to the rigorous demands of the undiluted transactional
immunity standard by permitting testimonial immunity at the federal
level when the state makes the original grant. The "exception" theory,
therefore, appears to offer the most logical, straightforward reconcilia-
tion of Murphy and the Counselman rule.
Aside from logical considerations, there are practical reasons for
preferring the exception theory. It enunciates a standard that effectively
preserves the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. The fifth
amendment was intended to protect against one of the deplorable abuses
that attend the inquisitorial system of justice-a forced confession.9
The Supreme Court expressly held that because of the risk of collabora-
tion or misinterpretation by overly zealous governmental officials,
grants of transactional immunity constituted the only sound form of
protection under the Immunity Act of 1868.10 The exception theory,
because it immunizes the witness from prosecution by the federal gov-
ernment for a crime to which his testimony relates, offers the witness
protection that is substantially coextensive with the requirements of the
fifth amendment. As an incidental benefit, the exception theory affords
the federal government greater bargaining power in its investigative
function. A knowledgeable witness is not likely to provide extensive or
useful testimony unless he receives a grant, such as that provided by the
exception theory, that will protect him from any attempt to prosecute."'
Although a witness may be forced to answer under a grant of testimo-
nial immunity, his answer will probably contain no more information
than is absolutely necessary. In other words, to be useful, a witness must
not only answer, but he must answer freely.10 The federal agencies that
so vocally opposed the enactment of section 201 did so to prevent the
dilution of their investigative power that the testimonial immunity stan-
dard necessarily implies.'1
99. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
100. See note 45 supra.
101. See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
102. See notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text.
103. See note 97 supra.
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Although it constitutes the soundest explanation of the impact of
Murphy on Counselman propounded thus far, the exception theory does
not offer the best answer to the degree of immunity problem. A more
acceptable alternative which would permit retention of the Counselman
principle of one standard of immunity and at the same time minimize
friction between state and federal governments is available. Under this
formula transactional immunity must invariably be accorded to wit-
nesses when the federal government is the immunizing body. The state
is similarly required by Counselman and Malloy to afford full transac-
tional immunity from prosecution within its own jurisdiction, but in
deference to federalism the state can grant no immunity from federal
prosecution. The fifth amendment, however, prohibits federal prosecu-
tion of a witness who has been granted transactional immunity by a
state government agency, although the state cannot impose such a de-
mand. Therefore, the witness receives immunity from prosecution ir-
respective of whether the state or federal government is the immunizing
body. Furthermore, under this formula the concept of federalism is
served to its fullest extent, because the state does not dictate a legal
result in federal jurisdiction. On these bases, this formulation, rather
than the exception theory, better promotes the interests of the individ-
ual, the fifth amendment under Counselman, and the concept of federal-
ism.104
4. Split of the Circuits Over Section 201.-The various theories
are illustrated by the opinions in several recent cases that examined the
conflict between transactional and testimonial immunity in the context
of situations that involved constitutional challenges to section 201. The
circuit courts split over the question; the Ninth Circuit 5 sustained sec-
tion 201 and the testimonial immunity standard, the Third"' and Sev-
enth107 Circuits invalidated section 201 in favor of transactional immun-
ity.
In Stewart v. United States,'° appellants, after they had been
granted immunity under section 201, refused to answer questions before
104. Under the proposed solution, the practical result is that the witness receives transac-
tional immunity, or immunity from prosecution for the offense to which the testimony relates,
whether he is a federal witness or a state witness. Thus, the Counselman rule is satisfied to the
utmost extent.
Moreover, since states do not attempt to dictate a federal legal result, federalism is served to
its fullest. The Constitution would foreclose federal prosecution when, under federalism, the states
cannot prosecute.
105. See note 108 infra and accompanying text.
106. See note 113 infra and accompanying text.
107. See note 110 infra and accompanying text.
108. 440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1971).
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a federal grand jury on the ground that transactional, and not testimo-
nial, immunity from proseuction is required of the federal government.
The court explained that it had found no case holding that only transac-
tional immunity could withstand fifth amendment scrutiny. Rather, the
court quoted extensively from Murphy to demonstrate that the Supreme
Court had sanctioned testimonial immunity and had sub silentio over-
ruled Counselman. The court failed to recognize, however, that the
passages it extracted from Murphy referred only to a situation in which
the state attempts to grant immunity." 9 Relying erroneously upon the
Murphy reasoning, which is clearly limited to one specific situation, the
court upheld section 201.
More recently, In re Korman"' and other lower federal court
cases"' took a contrary position, holding that section 201 is unconstitu-
tional. Korman addressed the pivotal issues whether Murphy had sub
silentio overruled Counselman and whether the statements in
Counselman were mere dicta. The court found that the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Counselman was not dicta and that even if it had been, the
rule in Counselman had been elevated to a binding standard by Brown
v. Walker and other subsequent cases. The court also found that
Murphy had not overruled Counselman, basing this finding on the fact
that the Supreme Court had cited Counselman as authority in Albertson
109. The court's reasoning reflects the argument proffered by proponents of § 201 during
legislative discussion. See note 93 supra.
110. 449 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 406 U.S. 952 (1972).
I11. In re Brown, 329 F. Supp. 422 (S.D. Iowa 1971); In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 407
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). Kinoy and Brown, 2 federal district court cases, have also assumed divergent
positions on this precise issue. Kinoy involved a refusal to testify under a grant of immunity
pursuant to § 201 of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. The witness contended that § 201
is invalid for failing to confer transactional immunity. The government countered predictably that
Counselinan's statements were dicta and, in the alternative, that Murphy had sub silentio overruled
Counsehnan. Holding § 201 unconstitutional, the court explained that Murphy had established an
exclusionary rule and that the federal government is required to grant transactional immunity in
every situation. Moreover, the court implied that § 201 might be valid if it were a state statute
granting testimonial immunity within federal jurisdiction, but that § 201 as a federal statute is
invalid. The court also held that the Counselman rule was not dicta and that Murphy had not sub
silentio overruled Counselman.
Brown raised the same question in a unique way. There a witness refused to answer under a
grant of immunity on the grounds that § 201 is applicable to his predicament because 18 U.S.C.
§ 259 (1970) states that when a new statute is "inconsistent" with one being replaced the old statute
is automatically repealed, and that § 201 is invalid for failing to grant transactional immunity. The
government uncharacteristically agreed that § 201 is invalid, but argued that the repeal of the
former governing statute had been delayed so that the witness had actually received transactional
immunity and must testify. The court adopted the government's argument and held that use and
fruits immunity and transactional immunity were not so "inconsistent" with one another that § 201
automatically repealed the old statute. The result is that the witness received transactional immun-
ity as required by the Murphy exclusionary rule.
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v. SA CB, a case that postdated Murphy.12
In United States ex rel. Catena v. Elias,"' a state witness had
refused to testify before the New Jersey State Commission of Investiga-
tion on the basis that the failure of the New Jersey statute to accord
witnesses transactional immunity is a violation of the fifth amendment.
Examining Counselman and Brown v. Walker and the impact of
Murphy on the two-sovereignties rule, the court found that the basic
premise underlying the whole line of Supreme Court cases has been that,
under the fifth amendment, the immunizing body must afford the most
complete protection possible. The court held that, from a pragmatic
viewpoint, only full transactional immunity provides maximum insula-
tion. Cognizant of the problem of federalism, the court expressed the
view that the compelling concern to offer the optimum degree of im-
munity overrides the concern for federalism. 1 4 The result of the decision
appears sound," 5 but the reasoning was probably erroneous, because the
court overlooked the point that under the Murphy exclusionary rule
considerations of federalism are more than just influential; they are
absolute.
B. Supreme Court Resolution of the Counselman-Murphy
Conflict-Kastigar v. United States"'
In Kastigar v. United States, petitioners were subpoenaed to ap-
pear before a federal grand jury in the Central District of California.
Prior to their appearance, the district court, on application of the gov-
ernment, ordered petitioners to appear and answer the grand jury's
questions under a section 201 grant of immunity, and in so doing,
rejected petitioner's argument that the scope of the immunity afforded
112. The court, however, in striking down § 201, made the unnecessarily broad statement
that any jurisdiction that seeks to compel a witness to testify must grant full transactional immun-
ity. The exclusionary rule does not justify such a statement, although there are cogent reasons that
militate in favor of such a standard. See notes 77-78 supra and accompanying text. The court in
In re Korman committed the same mistake that the Stewart court did, although it reached a
different conclusion. Stewart held that Murphy allows testimonial immunity grants by federal and
state governments. That is incorrect. The exclusionary rule, in fact, requires the federal government
to grant transactional immunity. Korman stated categorically that Counselman demands transac-
tional immunity from all jurisdictions. The exclusionary rule, however, provides that the states can
grant only testimonial immunity within the federal jurisdiction.
113. 449 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1971) (en banc), rev'd, 406 U.S. 952 (1972).
114. See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra.
115. Because New York failed to afford transactional immunity within its own jurisdiction
it violated both the Murphy and Counselman rules. The court reached the right result, however,
but unfortunately stated that it was because the state had not granted transactional immunity
within federal jurisdiction.
116. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
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was not co-extensive with the fifth amendment. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.' On writ of certiorari, the Supreme
Court affirmed the two lower court decisions, and held that a witness
can be compelled to testify under a grant of testimonial immunity.
At the outset, the Court discarded the holding of Counselman v.
Hitchcock and found that transactional immunity extended protection
to a witness beyond the demands of the fifth amendment.' The Court,
surprisingly, reaffirmed its decisions in Brown v. Walker and Ullmann
v. United States. Both Brown and Ullmann were substantial reiterations
of the Counselman rule."' There is, therefore, some indication that the
transactional immunity standard may persist despite the Court's explicit
abandonment of Counselman. If the Counselman rule has in fact re-
tained some vitality, then one of the alternative theories reconciling
Counselman and Murphy discussed previously might better have served
the Court's purposes. It seems clear from the entire opinion, however,
that the transactional immunity standard has been supplanted by a
testimonial immunity requirement.
The Court in Kastigar relied substantially on two arguments to
justify its holding-first, that the "reasoning" and "result" of Murphy
overruled Counselman; and secondly, that from a practical standpoint,
placing the burden of proof upon the government to show lack of taint
adequately protects a witness under the fifth amendment. The first of
these arguments is unpersuasive because the Murphy decision was in-
tended to relieve an inherent problem of federalism and was meant to
apply only when the state is the immunizing authority.Y0 The Court
apparently recognized the inapplicability of Murphy, conceding that
Murphy was not directly on point and that it had not explicitly overruled
Counselman.' The Court, however, did find that both the "reasoning"
117. Stewart v. United States, 440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1971). See notes 105 & 108 and
accompanying text.
118. In rejecting the principle of Counselman the court stated: "We hold that such immunity
from use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination,
and therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege. While a grant of
immunity must afford protection commensurate with that afforded by the privilege, it need not be
broader. Transactional immunity, which accords full immunity from prosecution for the offense
to which the compelled testimony relates, affords the witness considerably broader protection than
does the Fifth Amendment privilege." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
119. See notes 51-54 supra and accompanying text.
120. See notes 70-73 supra and accompanying text. Justice Douglas, in his dissent to
Kastigar, argued that: "Murphy overruled not Counselman, but Feldman v. United States, which
had held 'that one jurisdiction within our federal structure may compel a witness to give testimony
which could be used to convict him of a crime in another jurisdiction.'" Kastigar v. United States,
406 U.S. 441, 463 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
121. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,457-58 (1972).
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and the "result" reached in Murphy compel the conclusion that testimo-
nial immunity is constitutionally sufficient."' This argument, however,
is equally unpersuasive. Initially the majority found that Murphy had
permitted a testimonial standard, but the Court did not recognize that
Murphy was concerned with federalism and applies only when the state
is the immunizing body. The majority then reasoned that since Malloy
v. Hogan required that the same standard govern both state and federal
immunity, only use immunity need be granted by the federal govern-
ment. It is abundantly clear that Murphy was an exception to the
Malloy requirement and that the effect of Malloy was to extent federal
standards to the states rather than state standards to the federal govern-
ment.'2
The second of the Court's two primary bases for its decision was
that the federal government is required by Murphy to negative the
existence of taint when a grant of immunity is shown.' The Court
explained further that the government, to carry its burden of proof,
must show more than a mere negation of taint, but must prove that the
evidence proffered was obtained from a legitimate source wholly inde-
pendent of the compelled testimony. Although the burden of proof im-
posed upon the government appears to be substantial, its effectiveness
depends entirely upon the integrity and good faith of the prosecuting
officials.25 They alone have access to the facts necessary to prove taint
and only they can trace the production and use of the compelled testi-
mony. The state, therefore, can merely assert the existence of an inde-
pendent source and if the defendant-witness can produce no contrary
evidence, the burden will have been satisfied. Moreover, the good faith
of the head prosecutor may not constitute a sufficient safeguard, be-
cause one of his remote subordinates may have used the information,
and the obstacles to the defendant's discovery of this evidence are proba-
bly insurmountable. The spirit of the fifth amendment requires that the
innocence or guilt of defendants not depend upon the good faith of its
interrogators. Rather, the fifth amendment was intended as a safeguard
against such silent abuses by the state. The Supreme Court, by its
decision in Kastigar, has perhaps opened the door to such abuse.
Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Kastigar, compared
the situation in that case to the exclusion of a forced confession. 25 Such
an analogy is misleading, however, because an immunity statute and an
122. Id. at 458.
123. See notes 66-70 supra and accompanying text.
124. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972).
125. Id. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 461.
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exclusionary rule of evidence are fundamentally different in nature. As
Mr. Justice Marshall explained in his dissent, an exclusionary rule of
evidence operates after the fact without attempting to erase the mark
of government impropriety. An immunity statute, on the other hand, is
an implicit recognition that the Constitution permits the "impropriety"
only so long as the witness is fully protected. Because an exclusionary
rule of evidence operates after the fact, the only viable alternative is
exclusion of the confession. Because an immunity statute must be in-
voked before the fact there is ample time to reflect on the consequences
of conferring immunity. An ex post facto correctional measure such as
an exclusionary rule of evidence is not at all comparable to a constitu-
tionally sanctioned grant of immunity.
III. CONCLUSION
The fifth amendment was conceived in abhorrence of the abuses of
the inquisitorial system of justice. The immunity standard established
in Kastigar v. United States, however, may only discourage and not
prevent the abuses that motivated the amendment. Under the Kastigar
standard, witnesses will be protected from self-incrimination only by the
good faith resolve of the inquiring authority not to allege an independent
source of information when one does not actually exist, since the protec-
tion offered a witness in the form of an affirmative burden of proof upon
his governmental adversary is only nominal in relation to the practical
difficulties of disproving an alleged independent source of information.
The Court's adoption of the Kastigar rule implies that the Court has
either rejected or pretermitted the various alternatives outlined herein
that would have preserved the holdings of both Counselman and
Murphy and have afforded full constitutional protection to witnesses.
Instead, the inquiring government is requested to regulate its own inves-
tigatory operation to better protect the basic human right of those it
questions-a situation that is not altogether salutary.
R. ANTHONY ORSBON
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